演講者簡介 : Prof. Ueng, Shyh-Fang為Ph.D. in Economics，Texas A&M University (1991)。
現為本所副研究員。
其主要研究領域為為賽局理論及應用、產業經濟學及政治經濟學。
演講摘要 : This paper studies the voting equilibrium in the situation where the resolution of one organization will inflict damage on other organizations; and players can be simultaneously members of several organizations. With simple majority voting rule of the legislating organization, the blocking equilibrium apportions all surplus to its multi-identity members if they are its majority; while most of the surplus to its single-identity members recruited by the blocking coalition and only the residual the them if they constitute only a minority. Moreover, with unanimous voting rule, a proposal is more likely to be blocked if it conceives strictly positive net benefit for all multi-identity members of the legislating organization than the one that does so for only part of them. In the latter case, if the discrepancy between the collective incentive to pass and block it is small, only those multi-identity members threatened with net damage attain the blocking surplus.
