演講者簡介 : 吳震台先生為Ph.D. in Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison (2003)。
現為本所博士後研究。
其主要研究領域為Microeconomic Theory。
演講摘要 : More public information reduces information asymmetry between a buyer and a seller in lemon problems. We show that the cost, which is the information rent, to implement given allocations of the trading good increases as information asymmetry becomes greater. This result holds for general information structures ranked by MIO (Monotone Information Order). On the other hand, the change of the benefit, which is the gain from trade, collected by the allocations can, in general, go either direction. In contrast to the results in Ottaviani and Prat (2001) for affiliated information structures, we obtain that when the buyer has all bargaining power, his welfare, which is the difference between the gain from trade and the information rent, dose not necessarily increase by committing to publicly reveal his information.
