演講者簡介 : Myrna Wooders 為Ph.D. in Economics， University of Minnesota。
現為英國華威大學經濟系教授及 Fellow of the Econometric Society，是 Journal of Public Economic Theory 的主編及 Economics Bulletin 的Founding主編。
其專長領域為公共經濟、賽局理論、及一般均衡理論。
演講摘要 : In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self interested behavior. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few groups of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we define and characterize a family of games admitting existence of approximate Nash equilibria in pure strategies that induce partitions of the player sets with the desired properties. We also introduce the Conley-Wooders concept of ‘crowding types’ into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player – those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others- and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With the assumptions of ‘within crowding type annonymity’ and a ‘convexity of taste-types’ assumption we show that the number of group can be uniformly bounded
