Collaborative Tax Evasion and Social Norms:

  • 研討會日期 : 2002-12-13
  • 時間 : 15:45
  • 主講人 : 張俊仁教
  • 地點 : B棟110室
  • 演講者簡介 : 張俊仁教授為中興大學經濟學博士。 現為本所助研究員。 其主要研究領域為勞動經濟、國際金融及總體經濟
  • 演講摘要 : This paper makes a preliminary attempt to model a phenomenon of collaborative tax evasion between a seller and his customer and incorporates the social norm into such collusive tax-evading activities. It is found that, due to the existence of the social norm, more prevalent collaborative tax evasion at the status quo tends to intensify the extent of the tax evasion itself; this thus furnishes a self-fulfilling equilibrium and it may also give rise to multiple equilibria. More importantly, the snowballing effect has a decisive influence not only in determining the conformity of consumers to the tax code, but also in terms of the deterrent effect of the authority’s tax enforcement. If collaborative tax evasion is initially rampant, raising fines for tax evasion will give rise to a strong venal effect that will increase tax evasion. Once this perverse effect outweighs the usual deterrent effect associated with raising fines for tax evasion, a more severe fine may result in higher rather than lower tax evasion.