Coupons and Price Discrimination in Vertically-Correlated Markets

  • 研討會日期 : 2003-04-29
  • 時間 : 15:00
  • 主講人 : 胡均立教授
  • 地點 : B棟110室
  • 演講者簡介 : 胡均立教授為美國紐約州立大學石溪分校經濟學博士。 現任國立交通大學經營管理研究所副教授。 相關研究領域為環境經濟學、生產力與效率、法律的經濟分析及策略經濟學等
  • 演講摘要 : This research analyzes the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies with respect to manufacturer and retailer coupons. In a model with one manufacturer selling its product to one retailer, it is found that the retailer can achieve third-degree price discrimination equilibrium in retail markets by issuing coupons to demanders with higher elasticity. Although facing only one retailer, the manufacturer can also achieve the same third-degree price discrimination equilibrium by issuing coupons directly to demanders of higher elasticity. However, when only one firm issues the coupon, both manufacturer and retailer coupons can help alleviate the channel profit loss due to double marginalization. If the manufacturer and the retailer non-cooperatively issue coupons, then the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to those under the successive third-degree price discrimination. Moreover, cooperative strategies between the manufacturer and the retailer can eliminate double marginalization, achieve the vertical integration effect, and lead to higher profits, consumer surpluses, and social surpluses than non-cooperative coupon strategies.