Allocation of Decision-Making Authority with Principal's Reputation Concerns
2003/07/01
研討會日期 : 2003-07-01
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : 蔡崇聖教授
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : 蔡崇聖教授為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Wisconsin-Madison(2002)。
現為本所助研究員。
其主要研究領域為Public Economics、 Microeconomics及Political Economy。
演講摘要 : This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority and consult the agent (an expert), or delegate the authority to the agent; however, the outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority. In an informative equilibrium, we show that if the ex post reputation is sufficiently important for the principal, the good one always keeps the authority, and the biased one keeps the authority with positive probability, but not always. Alternatively, the outside evaluator prefers the agent's discretion if the allocation of authority is beyond the principal's control. Therefore, the principal keeps the authority too often when she can choose the allocation of authority.
