The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
2002/03/12
研討會日期 : 2002-03-12
時間 : 14:00
主講人 : Pao-Li Chang
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Mr. Pao-Li Chang Chen為Ph.D. in Economics， University of Michigan (expected 2002)。現正申請本所研究職務中。
其主要研究領域為International Trade及Econometrics
演講摘要 : Over its five decades of history, the GATT dispute settlement procedure has evolved from minimal treaty clauses into the remarkably sophisticated institution that it is today under the WTO. This paper develops a unified theoretical model of the dispute settlement mechanism to explain the stylized facts observed across different decades of the GATT/WTO regimes. At the panel stage, the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling is introduced to explore its effects on countries' incentives to block/appeal a panel report under the GATT/WTO regime. The model is able to explain the surge in blocking incidence during the 1980s over the preceding GATT years and the immense frequency at which the new appellate procedure under the WTO is invoked. At the consultation stage, a two-sided asymmetric information framework is employed to study the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and interactions in using, this dispute settlement mechanism. It is shown that the magnitude of the political cost relative to the potential benefit that the complainant stands to gain when using this mechanism determines the pattern of filing activity and the frequency of various procedural outcomes. This result, when confronted with the statistics on disputes in different decades of the GATT regime, provides us an indicator of how well the dispute procedure has worked during various decades, in terms of how much this procedure has been subject to potential power politics.
