Minimal Rights, Maximal Claims, Duality, and Convexity for the Resolution of Conflicting Claims

  • 研討會日期 : 2002-02-26
  • 時間 : 14:00
  • 主講人 : 葉俊顯
  • 地點 : B棟110室
  • 演講者簡介 : 葉俊顯先生為Ph.D. in Economics, University of Rochester (expected 2002)。現正申請本所研究職務中。 其主要研究領域為Game Theory、Microeconomics、Mechanism design 及Political Economy。
  • 演講摘要 : We consider the problem of dividing some amount of an infinitely divisible and homogeneous resource among agents having claims on this resource that cannot be jointly honored. A “rule” associates with each such problem a feasible division, interpreted as a recommendation for the problem. Our goal is to uncover the structure of the space of rules itself. For that purpose, we study “operators” on the space, that is, mappings that associate to each rule a new one. Duality, claims truncation, attribution of minimal rights, and convex combinations are the four operators we onsider. We first establish a number of results linking these operators, such as idempotence, commutativity, and distributivity. Then, we determine which properties of rules are preserved under each of these operators, and which are not.