Bargaining with Commitment: Strategic Moves, Investment and Conflict
2013/07/16
研討會日期 : 2013-07-16
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Tomas Sjöström
地點 : Conference Room C103
演講者簡介 : Tomas Sjöström received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 1991. He is currently James Cullen Chair in Economics at Rutgers University. His research fields are game theory, international relations, and neuroeconomics.
演講摘要 : We consider a simple bargaining model where conflict occurs if the players cannot agree to share a resource peacefully. The optimal strategy is to either make a "hawkish" commitment or a "dovish" concession. There is a unique equilibrium with sufficient uncertainty about preferences. Increasing the cost of conflict can make a conflict more likely, because hawkish behavior becomes more profitable as a dovish opponent would make larger concessions to avoid a conflict. We study the incentives to make strategic investments, for example, to build settlements that would make a concession more costly. If actions are strategic complements, and there is a defensive advantage in case of a conflict, then it is optimal to over-invest in settlements (the "Fat Cat" strategy): the player that builds settlements gets a higher benefit from the status quo, which makes him less threatening and (with strategic complements) makes the opponent less hawkish. If, however, there is an offensive advantage, building settlements makes a player more threatening, so it is optimal to under-invest in settlements (the "Puppy Dog" strategy). When actions are strategic substitutes, the optimal investment strategy is either the "Lean and Hungry Look" or the "Top Dog strategy".
