演講者簡介 : 馮勃翰教授為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Rochester (2005)。目前為Assistant Professor，Concordia University與Visiting Assistant Professor，Northwestern University。其主要研究領域為Political Economy、Public Finance、Managerial Economics及Applied Microeconomic Theory。目前正申請本所研究職務中。
演講摘要 : We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining in which policy making proceeds until the proposer has no more incentive to make a new proposal to replace the previously approved policy. We characterize stationary Markov perfect equilibria for the game and show that in all pure-strategy equilibria, a majority of voters without proposal power have an incentive to protect each others’ benefits to secure their own long-term bargaining positions in the legislature. As a consequence, the value of proposal power is constrained.
