Ordinal Versus Cardinal Voting Rules: A Mechanism Design Approach
2014/02/11
研討會日期 : 2014-02-11
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : Mr. Semin Kim
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Mr. Semin Kim will receive his Ph.D. in Economics from The Ohio State University in 2014. His primary research focuses on Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design Theory, Positive Political Theory and Secondary is Behavioral and Experimental Economics. He is applying for the position of the Institute of Economics, AS right now.
演講摘要 : We consider the performance and incentive compatibility of voting rules in a Bayesian environment: agents have independent private values, there are at least three alternatives, and monetary transfers are prohibited. First, we show that in a neutral environment, i.e., when alternatives are symmetric ex-ante, essentially any exante Pareto efficient ordinal rule is incentive compatible. But, importantly, we can improve upon ordinal rules. We show that we can design an incentive compatible cardinal rule which achieves higher utilitarian social welfare than any ordinal rule. This cardinal rule, applied in an environment with exactly three alternatives, is closely connected to the (A,B)-scoring rules in Myerson (2002). Finally, we show that in the non-neutral environment introduced in Majumdar and Sen (2004), every incentive compatible ordinal rule on the domain of single-peaked preferences is a peak-only rule.
