Information Acquisition and the Equilibrium Incentive Problem
2014/01/21
研討會日期 : 2014-01-21
時間 : 14:00
主講人 : Ms. Peng-Ju Su
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Ms. Peng-Ju Su will receive her Ph.D. in Economics from University of Washington, Seattle in 2014. Her research focuses on Contract Theory, Information Economics, Organizational Economics, Game Theory, and Industrial Organization. She is applying for the position of the Institute of Economics, AS right now.
演講摘要 : I study the optimal incentive provision in a principal-agent relationship with costly information acquisition by the agent. When it is feasible for the principal to induce or to deter perfect information acquisition, adverse selection or moral hazard arises in response to the principal's decision, as if she is able to design a contract not only to cope with an existing incentive problem, but also to implement the existence of an incentive problem. The optimal contract to implement adverse selection by inducing information acquisition, comparing to the second best menu, exhibits a larger rent difference between an agent in efficient states and whom in inefficient states. The optimal contract to implement moral hazard by deterring information acquisition, comparing to the second best debt contract, prescribes a lower debt and a reduced share of output residual. If imperfect information acquisition is induced, the equilibrium incentive problem is stochastic, the distribution of which is implemented by the principal, and countervailing incentives are present.
