演講者簡介 : Professor Chung received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1999. He is currently a Professor at Department of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research field is Microeconomics.
演講摘要 : In applications of game theory, a player is sometimes an individual, and sometimes a collective (e.g., a family, a firm, or a country). In this paper, I model any player, whether a collective or an individual, as a collection of agents making different decisions at different moments, with no single agent having perfect control of everything, who nevertheless are epistemically connected. Different kinds of players, from collectives to individuals, differ only in the specific ways these agents are epistemically connected. I first use this framework to reproduce the forward induction reasoning as applied to individuals, where the connection among different agents of the same player is summarized by three epistemic axioms. By selectively dropping some of these three epistemic axioms, and by dropping the assumption that different agents of the same player share the same utility function, I then extend the forward induction reasoning to collectives.
