演講者簡介 : Professor Péter Esö received his PhD from Harvard University. He is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Oxford. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, and Political Economics.
演講摘要 : We propose a model of a competitive market for a divisible good in which both buyer and seller may possess concealable hard information about a relevant state of nature. When an agent knows the state he or she can verifiably disclose it, but an absence of evidence cannot be proved. The price, which reflects the agents' equilibrium disclosure rules, is set to maximize expected social surplus conditional on all available public information and does not necessarily clear the market. Under general conditions there exists an equilibrium consisting of disclosure rules, consistent beliefs, contingent market prices, supply and demand decisions. In an extended example we fully characterize these objects. As an agent becomes better able to discover concealable evidence he or she discloses a larger set of states. The other side of the market becomes more suspicious that unfavorable evidence is being concealed; the resulting pressure on the market price alters the optimal disclosure rule on both sides, and trade can be reduced even when prices do not change.
