學術研究

(Theory webinar) Incentive Design for Talent Discovery

日期 2021-02-09 (週二)
時間 09:00 AM
地點 Conference Room B110
演講者 Professor Erik Madsen
演講者簡介 Professor Madsen received his Ph.D. in Economic Analysis and Policy from Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2016. He is currently an Assistant Professor at New York University. His research fields are Incentive Contracting, Dynamic Games, and Industrial Organization.
摘要 In many organizations, employees enjoy significant discretion regarding project se-lection. If projects differ in their informativeness about an employee’s quality, project choices will be distorted whenever career concerns are important. We analyze a model in which an organization can shape its employees’ career concerns by committing to a system for allocating a limited set of promotions. We show that the organization optimally overpromotes certain categories of underperforming employees, trading off efficient matching of employees to promotions in return for superior project selection. When organizations can additionally pay monetary bonuses, we find that overpromotion is a superior incentive tool when the organization needs to offer high-powered incentives; otherwise, bonuses perform better.